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THE MODEL WATER CODE,
THE WISE ADMINISTRATOR AND
THE GODDAM BUREAUCRAT
FRANK J. TRELEASE*

The Wise Administrator, as every one knows, is the man in a
government office who protects "the public interests" (read my
interests) from actions which would adversely affect those interests,
when the public is (I am) otherwise unable to influence the course of
those actions. The other fellow is as easy to spot; he is the man in
government who makes decisions for me that I would rather, and
could better, make for myself.
In the eyes of many, water is our most precious resource and the
proper solution to the problems of water resources law is to put all
water use in the hands of the Wise Administrator. A distinguished
team of water law professors now advocates just that. A Model Water
Code, with Commentary,' is the work of Frank E. Maloney,
formerly dean and now professor of law at the University of Florida,
his co-worker Richard C. Ausness, and J. Scott Morris of Southern
Methodist University. In most respects it is indeed a model, for in
642 of the Code's 66 pages 2 the matter is handed to our friend in an

excellent fashion, with many provisions to guide his wisdom in the
administration of water resources planning, water management districts, a permit system for water uses, construction and operation of
wells and dams, protection of water quality, and weather modification. 3 Its one flaw is that in that other page and one half the very
heart of the law is given over to that other fellow. This article will be
very critical of that small part of the Code.4
The Model Water Code is not be be confused with the Model
Water Use Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commis*Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
1. F. Maloney, A Model Water Code, with Commentary (1972).
2. The book first sets out the Code in full, then repeats it, following each section or
subsection with explanations, for a total of 349 pages, plus preface and index.
3. The Chapter on Weather Modification is the product of Roger D. Schwenke, Esq., of
the Florida Bar.
4. The author has come to the conclusion that statements disagreeing with those of the
authors of the Model Code should not be stated as universal truths. In other words, I think I
shall use the phrase "I think" with frequency, despite the conventions of law review style. If
I were to say, "The Code is wrong in such a respect, because it ignores economic realities,"
the reader could be misled into wondering how Maloney, Ausness and Morris could have
failed to see such an obvious point, whereas if I say, "I think the Code is wrong because I
have the following opinion," the reader is more properly directed to the inquiry of how
Trelease can be so benighted. Minor quibbles not directed at the main points of the article
are placed in footnotes.
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sioners on Uniform State Laws in 1958. That Act has sat for 15 years
like a wallflower hoping to be asked for a waltz, while the Code has
already served as a model to one state, Florida, which in 1972
adopted its essential chapters with minor modifications.' It is now
offered to other eastern states which contemplate substituting a comprehensive water regulatory program for the law of riparian rights.
Certainly most riparian law states would do well to replace the common law and the patchy legislation some have superimposed upon it.
Maloney, Ausness and Morris outline the problems those states face.
As a nation, the United States is in the early stages of a water
crisis. Although the problem is more acute in some areas of the
country than others, the population explosion, accompanied by
great technological advances in industry and agriculture, has resulted
in progressively increasing demands on an essentially limited resource. In addition to the requirements of industry, the seasonal
needs of agriculture to provide water for crops and livestock at times
of lowest streamflow and least natural replenishment are putting
increased demands on eastern as well as western water supplies.
At the same time, as the demand for water for consumptive uses
has been burgeoning, the interest of ecologists and recreational users
in maintaining streamflows and surface and ground water levels has
assumed greater importance in the minds of the public and the state
legislatures. Concern over the adequacy of existing laws in the face
of present and emerging water resources problems is leading many
states to consider new methods of dealing with these problems.
In the East, the common law riparian system of water law has
come under criticism for its restriction on the use of stream water to
riparian owners and its requirement that the water be used only on
riparian land. Many critics feel that better use frequently may be
made at other places by riparian or nonriparian owners. A major
criticism of the system concerns the element of uncertainty associated with the reasonable use of water for nondomestic purposes.
Because the reasonableness of each use is determined by the needs of
other riparians, unforeseen conditions may arise when others commence or enlarge uses despite long nonuse of their rights. A further
uncertainty exists in those states where a riparian neither making nor
intending to make use of water can enjoin an existing use as unreasonable with regard to his right.
Another criticism of the system relates to the lack of administrative controls. In many jurisdictions the extent of a riparian's right of
reasonable use can be determined only by litigation. The critics
maintain that this uncertainty results in needless loss when water use
patterns of established industries are upset by later competing uses.
Perhaps of greater concern is the water unused or devoted to less
5. Water Resources Act of 1972 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.013 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
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valuable uses when industries fearful of such losses refuse to locate
in the area. Recognizing their lack of expertise and the inefficiency
of a case-by-case approach, the courts have been reluctant to become
involved. Also, the numerous courts are structurally not as capable
of uniformity in the application of the law as a single, centralized
agency.
A final disadvantage of the common law riparian system is the
failure to deal adequately with the problems of ground water and to
recognize its hydrologic interrelationship with surface water, both
diffused and contained in lakes and watercourses. 6

The Code deals with most of these problems in an admirable
fashion. All waters are placed under a single rule of law and a single
administration." A State Water Resources Board sits above three
divisions concerned with water use, water quality and weather modification.' The Board has supervisory authority over as many water
management districts as are needed to adequately cover the state. 9
The governing boards of the districts administer the water use permits,' 0 well drilling permits and regulations,' ' dam construction,
operation and regulation,' I and most functions of water quality
control.' ' The state board is charged with formulation of a state
water use plan, under directives that seem superior and comprehensive, and which admirably provide for balancing public and
private interests and economic and environmental considerations.' '
The state board also formulates a state water quality plan,' I water
quality standards' 6 and weather modification licensing and regulation.' 7
The chapter on water use permits is the principle concern of this
6. F. Maloney, R. Auchness, J. Morris, A Model Water Code (1972), v-vi. More detailed
statements are found at 69-75 and 156-157.
7. Id. at § § 1.03(8), 1.04. The Declaration of Policy (§ 1.02) relies heavily on the
"public trust," a concept highly developed in some states but having a very restricted
meaning in others. The police power would provide a more firm foundation in the latter.
8. Id. at § 1.05.
9. Id. at § § 1.06(10), 1.15. This administrative setup exists in Florida, but in some
states a number of districts, each fully staffed, each empowered to issue many types of
permits and regulations, all subject to supervision and review by the state board, may seem
unwieldy and duplicative.
10. Id. at § § 2.01-2.09. The district is itself a water development and using agency,
which could lead to some conflicts of interest when its uses are affected by or affect those
of other permittees or applicants.
11. Id. at § § 3.01-3.19.
12. Id. at § § 4.01-4.14.
13. Id. at § § 5.06-5.16.
14. Id. at § 1.07.
15. Id. at§ 5.04.
16. Id. at § 5.05.
17. Id. at § § 6.01-6.18.
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article. Most of it is beyond criticism. No person may make any
withdrawal, diversion, impoundment, or consumptive use of water,
other than a domestic use, without a permit.' 8 The person who
seeks a permit must establish that the proposed use is "reasonablebeneficial," a new concept with both quantitative and qualitative
aspects: a use of water in such quantity as is needed for economic
and efficient utilization, for a purpose and in a manner which is both
reasonable and consistent with the public interest.' 9 He must also
establish that his use will not interfere with existing uses and that it
is consistent with the public interest and with the state water plan. 2 0
The last requirement is an excellent one, putting teeth in the plan
and giving it meaning, elevating it from the too common inventory
without direction or force. Water needed to implement the state
water plan, including that needed to maintain minimum flows and
lake levels, may be reserved from use. 2 Water may be used beyond
the boundaries of riparian land, the watershed, or overlying land.2 2
Existing uses will ordinarily receive permits if the use is reasonable-beneficial and allowable under the common law.2 3 If a permit is
to be denied because the use is not reasonable-beneficial, the user
will receive compensation for the loss of his water supply.2 4
Permits are issued after application, notice to possible objectors,
and a hearing. 2 S If competing applications are filed, preference is
given to that use which best serves the public interest.2 6 The holder
of a permit may seek its modification during its term, but a request
for a substantial increase in water use will be treated as a new application. 2 7 The threat of revocation or suspension of permits will be
employed as a tool in enforcing the conditions of the permit and
provisions of the Code. 2 ' Revocation may also follow two years of
non-use of the water, unless due to extreme hardship caused by
factors beyond the user's control.2 9
18. Id. at § 2.01.
19. Id. at § § 2.03, 1.03(4).
20. Id. at § 2.02(1).
21. Id. at § 2.02(3). The minimum will prevent withdrawals that would be "harmful to
the water resources and the ecology of the area." I am not sure what changes in a water;
resource will harm it, or, since ecology is a dynamic process, when the introduction of a new
influence will harm it. It might be preferable to couch the prohibited harms in terms of
effects on man or values held by man.
22. Id. at § 2.02(2).
23. Id. at § 2.03(2).
24. Id. at § 2.03(4).
25. Id. at § 2.04.

26. Id. at § 2.05.
27. Id. at § 2.07.
28. Id. at § 2.08.
29. Id. at § 2.08(4). In an eastern state where irrigation is used to supplement natural
rainfall this period seems too short, since rainfall may be above normal and may not need
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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
So far the Model Water Code seems impeccable. It provides a very
good system for water planning, administration and control, designed
to protect the resource and the environment and to promote the
general public interest in maximizing all types of benefits that can
accrue from water use and water conservation. It includes excellent
provisions for authorizing and controlling the initiation of new water
uses. What remains? Only the questions of how water is to be divided
among private users and shifted to new uses. How many users will get
permits entitling them to share in the water available for private use?
If there is not enough water for all holders of permits, which users
will get the water? When new needs arise, how can the water be
switched from old uses to the new?
This is the stuff of the law of private water rights. The answers to
these questions are found today in rules of law, rules that establish
rights which can be enforced in court. If A has a water right, and B
without right takes A's water, A can enjoin B and thus receive the
water. If B takes the water by virtue of superior powers, such as
eminent domain, A's water right becomes the basis for a claim to
money. If A and B have rights to a source insufficient to supply
both, courts or administrators divide the water according to law. If B
has the greater need and A the water right, in one way or another B
can purchase A's right or at least buy his forbearance to enforce it.
Water rights are better defined, broader in scope and more saleable
under prior appropriation law than under riparian law, but both laws
create types of property rights. These the Model Water Code would
abandon, and for them it would substitute administration discretion.
In a period of water shortage, the local governing board is to put into
effect a plan imposing restrictions on classes of water users, restrictions on total uses, changing conditions of permits, and suspending
permits. 3 0 In an emergency the executive director of the district
may subject water uses to apportionment, rotation, limitation or
prohibition. 3 1 Shifts of water to new uses are to be made by granting permits for short periods, no longer than twenty years, and as
these expire the3 water may be granted to new users instead of renewing the permits. 2
Thus the Code proposes to substitute administrative control over
private water users in lieu of the property rights which now govern
them. To what end? Protection of the public, the environment?
supplementation for two years, or rotation of crops may eliminate the need for it in some
years.
30. Id. at § 2.09(1)-(6).

31. Id. at § 2.09(7).
32. Id. at § § 2.05, 2.06, see commentary at 175.
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No-that is all taken care of. To understand the choice between
property rights and administrative distribution, it must be very
clearly kept in mind that all we are talking about is water already
allocated to private use, that the state and its administrators have
issued permits for its use, that every use is reasonable-beneficial, that
all the uses can be made in times of water plenty. It must be remembered that all minimum flow requirements are met, that all other
environmental factors are protected, and that the state water plan is
observed and even furthered. The "public interest" stands neutral,
and the only question is, which people get to use the water. The
choice is between giving people, industries and cities water rights that
entitle them to water under stated conditions, rights that they may
use as they see fit and adjust among themselves as they may agree, or
giving the regulatory official the power to determine in his discretion
which water users get water in times of shortage, and to shift water
between uses and users as time progresses. In my view, the Wise
Administrator has done his work and the Bureaucrat now takes over.
The Code is designed for an easterner seeking a new water law for
his state. He should clearly understand this choice. To help him, I
offer an analogy to another resource with which he is quite familiar,
and which like water must be wisely used, protected, sometimes
preserved from use, and which must be shifted from old uses to new
and more desirable uses as times and needs change. Think land. Land
is just as valuable and indispensable a resource as water. Our lives and
our wealth depend upon it. The government, the ultimate source of
title, wishes to see that the resource is put to its highest and best use.
It could do this administratively. A "land bureaucrat" could allow its
temporary use for particular regulated purposes, at will or for a term
of years, but when a new or better use is seen, reallocate it by
moving off the present tenant and installing a new one. Instead, the
government allocates the land in discrete and identifiable parcels, as
private property. The land laws make these property rights very firm
and secure. Land is then available for use by individuals to produce
wealth. Since each person will try to make the best use of it that he
can, the total of individual wealth will approach the production of
maximum national wealth. Yet new and more productive uses by a
different person may come to be seen desirable. Since the land is a
valuable asset, if it were to be transferred to another person without
compensation, the first holder would be impoverished and the later
enriched. Therefore, the laws provide that the property rights are not
only secure but are also voluntarily transferable. The land can be
bought by the new user for the new purpose by paying the owner a
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price. In most cases the government is willing to let the change occur
because it knows the new use is better than the old, since otherwise
the buyer could not afford to pay the seller the capitalized value of
the seller's use plus a profit. If private land uses and transfers are
likely to have harmful effects on others, however, zoning laws, land
use planning laws and other regulatory devices may be used to prevent the harm. If the government comes to need the land for a public
purpose that outweighs its value for private purposes, it has power to
condemn it. In this fashion, social plans for schools, roads, parks,
green belts and housing projects are implemented. If such needs are
known before the government has disposed of the land, it may reserve it and prevent the acquisition of private rights: no homesteads
in Yellowstone Park.
How is the situation different if we say "water" instead of "land"
in the above paragraph? Water is also a valuable resource, and is used
by individuals to produce wealth. Its use, and investments in waterusing enterprises, can be encouraged by giving the user property
rights, though they have to be described differently because of the
nature of the resource. Its movement to higher and better uses can be
made by the same economic processes, or by eminent domain if
necessary. Its use can be regulated in the public interest, or forbidden, perhaps easier than are land uses.
The system of water law most closely resembling the property
concept of land law is the doctrine of prior appropriation, in its more
modernized form. Prior appropriation is regarded with suspicion,
even with what might be called prejudice, by many in the eastern
states. It has its faults, under it mistakes have been made, and it was
developed in the western states for application to a climate and
hydrology very different from the east, the midwest and the south.
Only Mississippi has enacted a slavish copy of western water law, 3
although West Virginia was saved from one only by a governor's
veto." Repeatedly, the authors of the Model Code state that prior
appropriation "in its pure form," is not for the eastern states. So be
it. Let the problems be approached as original propositions.
If an easterner wants the best of water use laws, he could make no
better start than first considering the provisions of the Model Code
for planning, regulating and protecting water resources. But he
should think very hard before he adopts the Code's system for distributing and redistributing the water allocated to the private sector.
33. Miss. Code Ann. § § 51-3-1 eq seq. (1972).
34. The governor stabbed my intellectual grandchild. The West Virginia bill was closely
modeled on my draft of a water code for Alaska. See Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act,
2 Land and Water L Rev. 1 (1967).
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WATER PERMITS AND WATER SHORTAGES

The Model Water Code's permit does not create a water right.
Before a permit can be called a right, it must be translatable into
water with some degree of predictability and enforceability. Predictability could occur, it must be admitted, under ideal conditions and
ideal administration. Since pre-Code users are to be licensed pretty
much as of course, 3 and post-Code applicants must demonstrate no
interference with existing uses, 3 6 a strong element of protection of
vested rights is present. This could work very well in areas where
there is a definite and dependable surplus over existing uses. If, for
instance, a new aquifer is discovered, tapped and explored, its recharge could be found, the effects of drawdown on other users determined and a safe yield calculated. Then permits for withdrawals
could be issued, making sure the wells are so located and spaced as to
capture the recharge. Each new use could be screened to see that it is
"reasonable-beneficial" and not wasteful or against the public interest. The governing board could keep a running tab on authorized
withdrawals, and when the total reaches the safe yield, close up shop.
The water supply would then be carved up into identifiable shares
and all shares allocated. Owners of such shares would be protected
by administrative withholding of permits from later users seeking to
crowd in. Each permit then would be a document that could be
cashed for water. There would be no "junior appropriators" with
insecure rights, and all water users would live in the best of worlds,
enjoying a firm right to a firm supply.
Alas, nature seldom gives us such a dependable supply. Even
ground water aquifers may fluctuate and water tables fall when
annual rains are subnormal and streams drop. As for streams, for
most a dependable flow is an illusion. Even in the eastern states their
discharges are widely and often wildly variable. How the Model Code
will be administered on such a stream is the real problem.
One way it could be done would be to find the low point in the
hydrograph, the base flow of the stream always available even in the
worst years, and limit permits to that flow. This has the disadvantage
of throwing away most of the water. The difficulty is compounded
since the State Water Plan must include a decision to maintain a
minimum flow, 3" for the base flow during drought is very likely to
be that minimum.
A second measure could modify this idea and alleviate the problem. New permittees could be required to build dams to store the
35. Model Water Code at § 2.03(2).

36. Id. at § 2.02(1)(b).
37. Id. at § 1.07(4).
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variable excess and thus provide themselves with firm supplies. 3 8 A
third measure could be to issue conditional permits which allow the
new user to draw water only when the requirements of existing users
and minimum flows are satisfied. 9 Something like this seems possible, in the view of the authors of the Code, for the Commentary
states, "Frequently, persons using ordinary permits would not be
tapping seasonal high flows. To prevent waste through non-use during this period, the governing board could grant special seasonal permits to allow capture of this water. Such permits would probably
notice of the governing board that surplus
become valid only after
40
water was available.
These measures, however, would add up to prior appropriation
pure and simple, and this, the authors tell us over and over again, is
not what is intended by the Model Water Code. Shortages are built
into the system. They come into being when insufficient water is
available to meet the requirements of the permit system or the state
water plan, or when total water use threatens water resources with
serious harm. 4 ' Advance plans are to be made for cutting back water
uses during the shortage by restrictions on and adjustments of the
permits. If the plans break down, and there is a threat to the public
health, safety, or welfare, to the health of animals, fish or aquatic
life, to a public water supply, or to recreational, commercial, industrial, agricultural or other reasonable uses, an "emergency" is declared and the district director can take direct action, not limited by
the shortage plan. 4 2
The Code itself tells us little about how water is to be divided in a
shortage or an emergency. The plan for shortages will include classification of permits according to source, method and use,4 and the
board may order a temporary reduction in total water use, 4 4 impose
restrictions on one or more classes of permits,4" make changes in the
conditions of an individual's permit,4 6 place restrictions on his use
38. Something like this was once done in Texas, where riparians had the priority to the
"ordinary flow" and appropriators were generally forced to provide storage. See Trelease,
Coordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights to the Use of Water, 33 Texas L. Rev.
24, 45 (1954).
39. Such conditional permits are issued in England and Wales, where the river authorities
may not issue a license if the intended abstraction would derogate from any "protected
right." Water Resources Act 1963, 11-12 Eliz. II c. 38 § § 26(2), 29. In practice licenses are
issued which allow the taking of water only when specified prior users are satisfied.
40. Model Water Code at 177.
41. Id. at § 2.09(2).
42. Id. at § 2.09(7).
43. Id. at § 2.09(1).
44. Id. at § 2.09(2).

45. IX.at § 2.09(3).
46. Id. at § 2.09(6).
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of water, 4 7 or suspend his permit. 4 If an emergency is declared,
orders may be issued requiring action which may include apportioning, rotating, limiting or prohibiting water uses.4 9
No guidelines are set forth for the exercise of this wide discretion.
The shortage plan must be adopted by regulation after public participation' 0 and opportunity for administrative and judicial review.'
The Commentary states that restrictions are to be applied on a class
basis, and that individual users will know in advance their relative
priority during a time of shortage.' 2 Apparently the plan may be
adopted before a particular permit is obtained or afterward, and
apparently it may be changed at any time through the rule-making
process.
Reduction, restriction, changes in permits, suspension of permits,
apportionment, rotation, limitation, prohibition-these are what the
water user may expect. The Code's solution to the legal uncertainties
of riparian rights is the substitution of these administrative uncertainties. The Commentary contains this inexplicable sentence: "It should
be noted that, unlike the permittee in a prior appropriation system,
the holder of a permit under the Model Water Code is assured of the
full amount of water allowed under the terms of his permit." 5 I can
only construe this cynically. Had I a permit, I would suspect that the
full amount the permit allows me is whatever quantity, if any, some
Goddam Bureaucrat doles out to me.
One could hope, of course, that discretion would be wisely exercised. A number of factors and guidelines come to mind. The Bureaucrat might think of rationing by proportionate reduction of withdrawals. This is the way shortages have been judicially handled
among western irrigators under riparian law.5I It is used more widely
than is thought in prior appropriation states, for ditch companies and
irrigation districts draw their wholesale supplies from the source
according to priority, but when the supply is short they retail it to
47. Id. at § 2.09(6).
48. Id. at § 2.09(6).
49. Id. at § 2.09(7). It seems probable that there will be more emergencies than shortages. The existence of a shortage must be declared by regulation, § 2.09(2). A regulation
must be initiated by adoption of a resolution by the governing board, it must be published

once within 10 days, the publication must give 10 to 20 days notice of a public hearing, if
the regulation is adopted it must be filed within 5 days with the secretary of state and
becomes effective 15 days thereafter. Approximately a month will elpase between the
determination to initiate controls and the going into effect of the shortage plan, § 1.09.
50. Id. at § § 2.09(1), 1.18.
51. Id. at § § 1.11, 1.22.
52. Id. at 193.
53. Id.
54. See e.g. Half Moon Bay Land Co. v. Cowell, 173 Cal. 543, 160 P. 675 (1916); Hunter
Land Co. v. Laugenhour, 140 Wash. 558; 250 P. 41 (1926).

April 19741

THE MODEL WATER CODE

the irrigators share and share alike.' ' All entered the project on the
same basis, and priority of use within the district is regarded as
immaterial. Proration is not a bad system for dividing water among
equals who must suffer equally. It is also used among householders in
cities when shortages require imposition of car washing and lawn
watering restrictions.
Yet proportionate reduction will not work in all cases. The public
health and safety must be considered, and cities can reduce their
intake only so much without serious problems of health and safety
arising. Some industries may require a steady flow to operate at all.
Orchards and vineyards may require preference over field crops, for a
shortage which killed perennial plants would cause much more serious harm to investments of time and money than would one that
caused the loss of an annual crop. If economic efficiency is a goal,
surely an important criterion, would not putting all the water on the
highest valued crops be desirable? Most industries produce more
wealth than do most farms, so should not manufacturing be preferred over agriculture?
I think, too, that the Bureaucrat might think about the part he
played in creating the shortage-if he had not given the last few
permits the shortage might not have arisen. The earlier permits were
issued for good, reasonable-beneficial uses, and there was water
enough for them until the Bureaucrat, by issuing the new permits,
cut into their supply for the drought years. Might he not owe them
some protection, and if this required an explanation to the later
permittees, would it be inequitable, unreasonable, to remind them
that until they came along there was no shortage, that they created
risks which were not present when the others initiated their uses?
I think the poor Bureaucrat, juggling equality, equity, economic
efficiency, public health and safety, protection of investment, and
protection of investment, and protection of workers' jobs and
farmers' livelihoods, might at this point take to the bottle, either
milk for his ulcer or whiskey to forget his troubles. I think he would
think that there must be a better way to run this railroad, some way
to get all those arguing, pleading people off his back.
DURATION OF PERMITS-SHIFTS OF USE

If the uncertainties that attend water shortages are solved or for
present purposes ignored, the next questions are how long a water
right should last and what provision should be made to accommodate
new and better uses of water as demands for them arise. "Security of
55. See Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 34 Idaho 303, 200 P. 341 (1921).
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water right" and "flexibility of water use" may sound at first blush
as if they are opposites, and the authors of the Code and the Commentary see them as rivals vying with each other for the lawmaker's
favor. If too much is given to one, the other is thought to suffer. Yet
the authors do see three alternative solutions to the problem: "The
first is to establish a permit term of short duration; the second is to
grant a long-term permit but also to impose a preference system; and
the third is to grant a perpetual permit and allow free alienability of
water rights."" 6 They state the arguments for each, then choose the
first, despite their stated fears that short term permits may deter the
investment of capital and labor in water works and uses.' ' Permits
for most uses may be issued for any period "not exceeding twenty
years," and the specific duration may be based on classification of
the permitted use according to source of supply or type of use.' "
Cities fare better, a city needing a longer period to retire a waterworks bond issue may get up to a fifty year term.' 9 Permits may be
renewed, 6" and while the Commentary states that the renewal applicant would have a "strong equitable position" 6 1 and the Code provides that all things being equal the renewal application will be preferred over one for a new use, 6 2 the Commentary goes on to say that
if ". . . changed conditions have intervened... the governing board
would be completely free to allocate available water in a manner that
'6
is best suited to these new conditions." 3
Security and flexibility are inextricably interwoven, but looking at
the thread of security for the moment the question may be asked
whether enough has been given. The authors, in the Commentary,
assume the "normal" period of a permit would be twenty years.
Their reason for selecting this, as against a longer or shorter term, is
the "belief that it would be long enough to provide reasonable security to water users and allow sufficient time to at least partially
amortize capital investment, while at the same time providing for
some degree of flexibility in the administration of the permit system." 6 4 The reason cities may get a fifty year permit is that officials
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development have stated
that ". . . federally supported projects involving public water supply
56. Id. at 173.
57. Id. at 173-75.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at § 2.06(1).
at § 2.06(2).
at § 2.07(3).
at 191.
at § 2.05(2).
at 191.

64. Id. at 189.
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systems frequently required local bond issues with maturity dates in
excess of thirty years. The fact that no such projects have been
approved in Iowa since the 1956 water statute suggested that a short
permit term [ten years] with respect to municipalities might have an
adverse effect on applications for federal assistance." '6 Is it assumed
that private investors are more careless with their money than the
federal government, and that they will be satisfied with partial
amortization? The water officials and courts of two western states
have struggled with the problem of how long a temporary water right
should last, although in a different setting, fixing the useful life of a
non-recharging aquifer. The New Mexico solution was forty years, on
the basis that this period was needed to pay out a farm.6 6 The
Colorado choice was twenty-five years, the payoff period of a bank
loan for wells and irrigation equipment. 6 7 In the east, industrial uses
may predominate, and the normal period for depreciation of a manufacturing plant is forty years. Some have useful lives of sixty or
more. If the water user gambles on obtaining a renewal of his permit,
he increases uncertainty, while if he accelerates his depreciation, the
added cost may discourage his investment. The authors conclude that
"... no compensation should be paid upon expiration of the permit
since the investment in theory is supposed to be amortized over the
life of the permit." 6" The investor must simply take or surmount
one or the other of these risks.
Turning to flexibility, the assurance that "...
water resources
[can] ... meet new needs and demands by transfer from existing
uses to more beneficial new uses,"6 9 it may be helpful to look

directly to what we are talking about. In the western states the
reference is to transfers from irrigated agriculture, which has the
earliest and largest consumptive water right, to municipalities and
industries which create the growing new demands. To the extent that
irrigation in the east increases to the point of consuming large
enough quantities of water to be incompatible with the growth of
cities, power plants and factories, the same shifts will there occur,
since generally the marginal utility of water for irrigation is less than
that for home consumption, commercial establishments, and manufacturing. The east may have another problem. In many areas entire
65. Id. at 190.
66. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966); see also Harris, New
Mexico's Role in the Development of the Law of Underground Water, 31 Dicta 41 (U. of

Denver 1954).
67. Fundingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Commission, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835

(1970).
68. Id. at 176.
69. Id. at 173.
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rivers are used for low-head, run-of-the-river electric power plants,
and upstream consumptive uses or interbasin diversions will diminish
the use for energy production. Another type of change may become
increasingly important all over the nation, the restoration of recreational opportunities and environmental values, which will shift the
water from the private back to the public sector.
Under the Model Code, the mechanism to accomplish these shifts
is the issuance of new permits to newly-favored users upon the expiration of old and now-to-be-discarded uses.7 0 I see several difficulties with this process. First, to the extent that the "normal" permit
lasts twenty years, flexibility is surrendered during its life. If the
application for the new use does not coincide with permit expirations, the new user may have to wait a fairly long time before water
becomes available. Second, the investment may have been only
partly amortized during the 20-year (or shorter) period. Third, the
holder will in most cases lose an asset more valuable than his investment, that is, the going concern value of his enterprise, the continuing opportunity to make a profit, which is presumably a contribution to the economy. Fourth, if it were my enterprise, I would
suspect that some Bureaucrat might solve the first problem and
aggravate the second and third by simply granting the permit and
squeezing the water out of me and other less favored users under the
shortage plans and emergency measures.
PRIORITIES AND SHORTAGES
We met our friend, the Bureaucrat charged with administration of
the Model Water Code, wondering how many permits to issue, and
we left him musing over a bottle after he found he had issued too
many. His western counterpart, often called the State Engineer, is a
happier man. True, the law he administers gives him the power to
deny a permit if there is no unappropriated water in the source, but
he exercises this power selectively and sparingly. If he has before him
the aquifer with a safe yield, or one with no appreciable recharge, he
will determine the total allowable withdrawal and deny permits that
would exceed it. This is done in his capacity as a Wise Administrator,
to protect the holders of shares in the resource from encroachment
and to protect those shares from dilution and encroachment.
On a fluctuating stream, however, unless every drop is already
allocated, he does not have to agonize over whether there is room for
one more water user. He cheerfully announces his willingness to issue
the permit for whatever water is left. His office will be very helpful,
70. Id. at 175.
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of course, and his records of the supply and the existing demands
upon it will aid the applicant in determining whether he wants to
take the permit. But the western Wise Administrator never says, "I
have determined that there is not enough water for you." It is up to
the applicant to determine the availability of water and the risks of
shortage, and whether he should seek stream flow, build a dam to
store unused seasonal high flows, forget the whole thing, or insert
himself higher on the priority list by buying out a senior appropriator. Prior appropriation is criticized for putting the entire burden of
"physical uncertainties" on the junior appropriator, 7 ' but even these
uncertainties are certainties, and the appropriator can gauge his
chances as to the worthwhileness of the venture or make such legal
and physical adjustments as are economically justified. If he takes
the junior right and gets no water when drought comes, he curses the
weather, not the Bureaucrat.
The easterner need not think that the transfer of this system to his
state would cause great disruption in the law. Priority is not as
strange to the east as is commonly supposed. Riparian law is usually
phrased in terms of allowing every riparian proprietor to make a
reasonable use of the water. Reasonableness is determined in view of
all of the circumstances, and in the language of the Restatement of
the Law, on the basis of whether the utility of the use outweighs the
gravity of the harm. 7 2 One would expect to find cases in which the
courts have said that a new use of great utility is reasonable even
though it takes water from an existing use of lesser utility. This
supposed "riparian flexibility" is sometimes praised, sometimes decried. The authors of the Code see it as creating uncertainty since a
riparian's right of reasonable use can be determined only by litigation.7 ' But before a riparian state trades this uncertainty for those
of administrative discretion, its lawmakers should look at the record
established by the cases. There is much more priority in riparian law
than the statement of the rule would indicate. In many cases the
reasonable use rule is applied to deny relief to a plaintiff who has
suffered only nominal or trivial harm. In many others it is used to
force one or the other party to make some adjustments so that both
uses can be accommodated. Riparian irrigators, inter se, have always
been understood to be entitled only to a share of the supply, long or
short. But almost without exception, the courts have favored a riparian plaintiff who has been impounding or diverting water for a
reasonable use, and have enjoined or assessed damages against a
71. Id. at 158.
72. Restatement of Torts, § 852.
73. Model Water Code at 78.
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defendant whose new upstream use has taken the water from the
plaintiff. Most of the courts base this result on the rule of reasonableness, but they always seem to find the new use is unreasonable
because it takes the water supply of, or otherwise causes substantial
harm to, an existing reasonable use. 7 4 The tentative draft of the
Restatement Second attempts to reflect this practice. It does not
come out flatly with a rule of priority but it does state that among
the factors to be considered in determining reasonableness are "the
protection of existing values of land, investments and enterprises,
and the burden of requiring the user causing the harm to bear the
loss." 7 In this light, turning the matter over to the Bureaucrat's
shortage plans and emergency orders may be a serious change in
eastern water law and may deprive water users with vested rights of a
protection they have in fact long enjoyed.
The easterner could improve on western law in several respects. If
the thought of priority distribution in times of shortage raises fears
that the most economical or undesirable uses may be foreclosed, it is
still possible to avoid calling in the Bureaucrat and to let the parties
solve the problem. One defect in most western appropriation laws is
the failure to provide for sales of water, as distinguished from sales of
water rights. Yet some secondary western water rights, shares of
stock in a reservoir or ditch company, are used in this fashion. For
example, some water users in Wyoming grow hay for cattle, some
grow sugar beets. Late in the season, a rancher may hold stock that
entitles him to so many acre feet of reservoir water while a beet
farmer's stream has run dry. Hay produces $25 to $40 an acre, sugar
beets $60 to $75. What happens is that the farmer "rents" the
rancher's water right at a price somewhere between the profit he will
realize on the beets and the profit the rancher will lose on the hay. 7 6
In New Mexico, a statute enacted in 1967 permits "leasing of the use
of water" by an appropriator to any other person, with the approval
of the State Engineer. 7" Under this act, growers of beans who anticipate a high price buy water from potato growers who face a glutted
market. Maximum efficiency is reached, since the high-value crop is
produced, and both water users share the profits. The Code's Bureaucrat could not do as well. If he were charged with distributing Wyoming water on the basis of economic efficiency he would allocate the
water to the beet grower, but the lucky farmer would get all his
74. The cases are collected in Restatement Torts (Second); (Tent. Draft No. 17, § 850B,
Associate Reporter's Note, at 115-117 1971).
75. Id. at § 850B(h) and (i).
76. Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress-CaseStudies in The Transfer of Water Rights,
1 Land & Water L. Rev. 1, 49 (1966).
77. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 75-40-1 to 75-40-7 (Supp. 1973).
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profits while the unfortunate rancher would suffer a severe loss. If he
attempted to avoid this by a criterion of equity, and gave half the
water to each, the highest and best use would not be served and
maximum production would not be reached.
Another example of how temporary transfers of rights or sales of
water would be of great utility is that of the city which gambled on a
junior right and is faced with an unusual drought. If farmers hold the
priority, I would assume that the Bureaucrat would say that the city
has the better use and would cut off the farmers' supply. The city
would get the water but the farmers would be bankrupted. This is a
social cost which must be reckoned, and the best way to account for
it is to have the city pay for the farmers' lost crops. An eastern
statute could improve on the system by allowing only owners of
permits to make purchases, and by limiting quantities to enough to
make up the shortage in the permitted supply. This would avoid the
use of water by unauthorized persons or in unauthorized quantities.
Cities could be given the power of eminent domain to enable them to
take temporary control of water rights at a fair compensation.
In some cases the rule of priority may not be thought to be the
ideal solution. In an unusual drought it can discriminate rather arbitrarily between persons who are essentially similarly situated. It has
been observed that on western projects all irrigators share in the
project's priority, and if its supply diminishes their shares are reduced proportionately. If under good planning an agricultural area is
seen to offer good possibilities for irrigation, and it is thought that all
irrigators should be treated equally in case of shortage, an eastern law
might provide for assigning the same priority to all the landowners,
even though they may use individual works initiated at different
times. The plan could replace the project and the plan could receive
the priority. This system would approximate the riparian solution to
shortages among irrigators, but could avoid the possibilities of over
crowding by too many riparians seeking a share, and would settle the
relationships between the irrigators as a group and industrial water
users, municipalities and other groups.
PERPETUAL RIGHTS AND FLEXIBILITY
The western water right is said to last forever,7" although no
statute explicitly so states. A better description would be that they
are "of indefinite duration," in view of the rules of abandQnment
and forfeiture for non-use and the possibilities of condemnation.
This quality of perpetuity is seen as an evil by the authors of the
78. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 459 (1931).
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Code, and is rejected for the twenty-year permit which allows "at
least partial" amortization of capital investment. My view is that
invested capital is not the only consideration, and that the going
concern, income-producing values of water use are often far more
important. The water right out to last at least as long as the enterprise. There may be no need to leave the owner of a mine-mouth
processing plant with a water right after the mine is exhausted. But
when we look far into the future and the crystal ball grows dim, a
perpetual right is as good as any. Why not give a city a perpetual
right? Is there any substantial reason to believe that in a half a
century a better use will be found for the water so it should be taken
from the inhabitants? If a rural town dwindles, so will its water use,
and so will its water right under the Code's rule of forfeiture for two
years non-use.7

9

As for the farmer, why should his water right not run to him and
his heirs forever, like the title to his land? If irrigation becomes
unprofitable, if he turns his farm to other purposes that need no
water, the water will revert to the public and be available for reallocation.
What about flexibility, accommodating new uses, avoiding freezing
water into old patterns of use, encouraging progress? It must be
learned that flexibility and security are not antipodes, they are not
incompatible. In most of the western states water rights are held in
the firmest fee simple, in perpetuity, but the rights are transferrable
and can move to other uses and to new users. The transfer occurs
when the price is right. The parties to the transaction decide the bid
and asked prices and the agreed sale price. Within the private sector,
the principal public interest is in seeing that the water is put to its
most efficient use and makes the greatest contribution to the
economy. No Bureaucrat need worry about this, it has the best of
guarantees. The buyer must be able to put it to better use if he can
offer the seller enough to induce him to forego the benefits he receives from the water. Since most water sources are subject to a
number of rights, and alternative sources of supply are usually available, monopoly does not present a problem. Nevertheless, cities are
usually given the power to condemn water rights in order to insure
transfers at a fair price.
The Administrator plays his proper part in transfers, however. The
rights of other appropriators must not be impaired, and every state
has procedures for supervision of the change to a new owner for a
new use and for notice to persons who may be affected. The most
79. Model Water Code at § 2.08(4).
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common restriction is that a change of irrigation water may be made
only to the extent of water consumed, not of total diversions, since
junior appropriators often depend upon return flows from senior
fields.8 0 The new use will also be examined to see that it conforms
to the public interest.8 1 The easterner should note that most western
procedures date long into the past, and that the number of recent
changes has brought to light some features that could be im8
proved. 2
THE EVILS OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION
The authors of the Code do not regard prior appropriation as all
bad. They use selected parts of it:
The Model Water Code employs a number of prior appropriation
features in chapter 2. The code provides that permits be granted for
specific quantities of water. As in the West, the permit system is
administered by a water regulatory agency. Also, the reasonablebeneficial use rule is strongly western oriented in its emphasis on the
public interest and prohibition of waste. In addition, the common
law restrictions to use on riparian land have been abandoned. 8 3
They find that protection of the resource, the environment and the
public trust and the adoption of state water plans and minimum
flows are not incompatible with these features. What they reject,
however, is the heart of the system, the method of allocating, distributing and reallocating water to and among private users.
The reasons they state for their rejection seem curious and unconvincing, simply not in point or not true. Over and over, like a litany,
the authors recite three charges against prior appropriation:

(1) But the western experience indicates that, in many cases, the
effect of prior appropriation may be to waste water that otherwise
could be put to beneficial use. To satisfy a senior appropriator at the
mouth of the stream, junior upstream appropriators may have to let
several times the amount of the appropriation pass by them to allow
for channel losses. 8 4 (2) Moreover, once an appropriator has begun
using a certain amount of water he will frequently continue to draw
that amount even though it may be considerably more than he really
needs, since failure to do so may result in loss of his appropriative
right to the excess. 8" (3) A final criticism of the prior appropriation
80. See Trelease & Lee, supra n. 76, at 23 to 29.
81. United States v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434 (1924).
82. The forthcoming report of the National Water Commission will have much to say on
the subject and should be consulted.
83. Model Water Code at 159.
84. Id. at vi, expanded at 77, repeated at 158.
85. Id. at vi-vii, expanded at 77, repeated at 159.
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system is its tendency to freeze the initial pattern of water allocation. In a number of western states, the appropriation of entire
stream supplies for irrigation has prevented industrial development
that could produce far more wealth for the state per unit of
8 6 water
than does the highly consumptive use of water for irrigation.
Easterners, do not believe what this book tells you about the evils
of prior appropriation law. There are some, but they are not these.
Take the fearsome freezes you are warned against. Look for yourselves at the population and industry crowded from Glendale to San
Diego, where rainfall is in the 10 to 20 inch range. Look at the last
twenty-five year's phenomenal growth of Phoenix, Tucson, Albuquerque and Las Vegas in the southwest desert. Look at the expansion of Salt Lake City, Denver and their environs, where all the
surface water was appropriated for agriculture three quarters of a
century ago.
As for waste by useless use of water to keep rights in force, I know
of no examples of this. Most of my farmer and rancher friends do
not have enough water to suit them and they husband it carefully; if
they have a surplus they are too busy doing useful work and earning
a living to burn up water they do not need. Furthermore, if the water
commissioner caught them doing it they would lose the right to the
excess anyway, for their right extends to that only which they can
beneficially use. If this evil exists unknown to me, the Model Water
Code does not cure it. The authors put the holder of a Code permit
under exactly the same compulsion. Section 2.08(4) states,
For nonuse of the water supply allowed by the permit for a period
of two years or more, the governing board may revoke the permit
permanently and in whole unless the user can prove that his nonuse
was due to extreme hardship caused by factors beyond his control.
The Commentary warns,
Under this section, revocation may be total or partial, and temporary or permanent. In addition to its use as a sanction, revocation
may also be employed8 7to formalize a complete or partial abandonment of permit rights.

The "waste" caused by the downstream senior on the dwindling
stream should concern the easterner not at all. His streams gain water
throughout their length, they do not lose it to desert soils. That such
.86. Id. at vii, expanded at 77, repeatea at 159.
87. Id. at 192.

April 19741

THE MODEL WA TER CODE

waste exists, even in the west, is doubtful. Some examples are erroneously misquoted from an early article of mine:
In the Frenchman's Creek area of Colorado, for example, it is necessary to reduce upstream pumping by 100,000 acre-feet of water
per year to protect downstream uses of 15,000 acre-feet, and at
Beaver Creek a decrease of pumping upstream by 20,000 acre-feet
would8 8 be necessary to protect a downstream flow of 1,000 acrefeet.
There was no "upstream pumping" on these creeks, the physical
problem was the pumping of groundwater that lowered the water
table and dropped the bottom out of the overlying stream. The legal
problem was caused by applying one rule of law to the stream and a
different one to groundwater, a problem since solved by placing all
the water under the single rule of prior appropriation. 8 9 If the
authors want a good example, however, I can supply one, the Platte
River in Nebraska, "a mile wide and an inch deep." It loses so much
through its bed that at least 700 cubic feet per second must be
allowed to pass North Platte so that 162 c.f.s. will be available to
supply the senior appropriators at Kearney, 100 miles downstream. 9 0 A waste of 538 c.f.s.? The richer lands are at Kearney, and
perhaps more can be produced there, at least the North Platte irrigators have never seen fit to buy out the Kearney irrigators. A better
explanation is that the 538 c.f.s. feed the alluvial aquifer underlying
a vast sea of corn and alfalfa that stretches along the valley, irrigated
by thousands of wells. At any rate, the fault is not that of prior
appropriation law but of historical accident. 9
There are some other problems the west faces that need not concern the east, except in taking warning of mistakes to avoid. Many
are leftovers from homemade construction and jackleg engineering
by the pioneers: inefficient and duplicating ditches, crosshauling of
water, and wasteful wild flood irrigation. Others result from a general
disrepair of records, so that there are unreported uses, records of
88. Id. at 77. The authors of the code cite Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River
Basin Development, 22 Law and Contemp. Prob. 301, 311. See text accompanying note 63.
It should also be noted that my article does not recommend a model state water code; the
misleading title was substituted for the original more accurate one by the editor of the
publication.
89. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § § 148-21-2 et seq. (Perm. Cum. Supp. 1969).
90. State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran, 138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W. 239 (1940).
91. Nebraska was settled from east to west as the homesteaders encroached on Indian
territory, so the early priorities are in the downstream east. In Colorado, however, the lands
at the foot of the Rockies were settled first so the senior rights are there, and the downstream lands were settled later as the junior appropriators pushed eastward against the
Cheyennes of the Smoky Hills.
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non-existent uses, and unauthorized and unreported changes. These
are the product of inadequate staffing and funding of administrative
offices. In still other situations western laws could be improved, as
has been noted in context.
So I ask the easterner to look not at the worst but at the best of
prior appropriation, to see how an eastern state might profit by and
avoid some mistakes and problems that have occurred in the west
and to build and improve on a law designed for shortages as his state
approaches conditions of shortage.
CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude by ending my role as a westerner lecturing to easterners, and offering a couple of testimonials from neutral
territory. A few years ago I had the opportunity to discuss water law
with Sir William Goode and Mr. Norman Rountree, the Chairman
and the Director of the British Water Resources Board. I had struggled through the involuted language of the Water Resources Act,
1963, 9 2 and thought I glimpsed the true nature of that Act's "protected right."
"Would you gentlemen be offended," I asked, "if I told you that
England, the home of natural flow riparianism, now has in practical
effect the western American law of prior appropriation?" They
looked at each other for a moment, then laughed. Sir William replied,
"Far from taking offense, we are very pleased, for we know that if it
is true, we have something that will work."
More recently I served as consultant to a United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization project studying water conditions and planning water use on the island of Jamaica. I was asked to suggest a law
to replace the hodgepodge of riparianism and fragmentary statutes
that govern the country's irregular rivers and complicated groundwater. The aim of the new law is to give aid and encouragement to
the developing Jamaican economy, based largely on irrigated sugar
cane with a more recent overlay of tourism, mining and manufacturing, and to protect the island's cities and tropical environment. In
submitting various drafts I encountered some resistance to American
language and quietly shifted from "prior appropriation" to the British "protected right," with which the Jamaicans felt more comfortable. During the process a counter proposal was made from another
source for an "administrative system" of permits for the "expected
constant yield" and for rationing water in times of shortage on the
basis of "the value of the particular uses" and "the national inter92. Water Resources Act, 11-12 Eliz. II, C.38 (1963).
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est." The supposed simplicity of this, compared to my allegedly
complicated recommendations, had a certain appeal, but eventually
my proposal won out. It has since received cabinet approval although
it has not yet been adopted by the Parliament.
During the discussion the Jamaican co-director of the project,
probably the future Commissioner for Water Resources, probed into
how operations would actually be conducted under it. He was quick
to see the type of pressures that could be brought and the difficult
decisions that would have to be made in determining the size of the
expected constant yield and whether one more permit could be
squeezed into it. He also saw the ease with which he could issue
permits that prohibited interference with previously issued protected
rights. And he was enchanted with the notion of handling shortages
by priority coupled with temporary transfers of water. "I see-under
the other system I might have to choose between shutting down a
new hotel or starving some cane farmers. But one or two farmers'
quota would supply the hotel, and I could just notify the hotel
manager to start negotiations. Why, I might even act as a broker and
help them get together."
Given the choice, most officials would rather be Wise Administrators than Goddam Bureaucrats.

